FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and a member of Worker’s Union filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA concluded between Continental and the Union. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.
The female fetus died during labor. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
Hortillano and the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA, but the parties still failed to settle their dispute. The Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of Hortillano, and affirmed by the CA.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term “dependent” could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported
ISSUE: Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
RULING: The Supreme Court has held that one need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
The issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
It is not a question whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Therefore, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
