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People v. Akil, G.R. No. 265570, April 7, 2025

FACTS: The Information accused Akil (of carnapping) taking with intent to gain a black Kawasaki Bajaj CT 100 motorcycle, valued at 92,952.00; and without knowledge and consent of the owner, JR Belardo.

The prosecution alleged that Belardo parked his motorcycle near the Tupi Municipal Gym at around 12:58 PM on August 22, 2017. It disappeared when he returned at 5:00 PM the same day. The CCTV footages of Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (MDRRMC) showed a tall man wearing a face mask, a ball cap, and sunglasses took the motorcycle away. While Belardo did not see the said person’s face, he saw that he was wearing a yellow Fubu shirt and faded pants, and carried a sling bag. Afterwards, Belardo went to the nearby police station to report the incident. The police told Akil that they arrested an individual for stealing a motorcycle in Tupi. They identified him as Akil, from whom they retrieved a red ball cap, sunglasses, a black sling bag, a black mask, and a yellow Fubu shirt. Belardo claimed that Akil confessed that he stole his motorcycle. 

Akil denied the accusation and claimed that he was in his house in Barangay Mabuhay, General Santos City at the time of the incident. However, the police dragged and arrested him when he went to Tupi to attend a festival on September 9, 2017.

The RTC found Akil guilty beyond reasonable doubt after the prosecution established his guilt by circumstantial evidence collected by the police. The evidence includes the alleged CCTV footage; the arrest of Akil for stealing a different motorcycle in Tupi, South Cotabato; retrieval in Akil’s possession, during his arrest of a red ball cap, a yellow shirt, a black mask, sets of keys, and a sling bag; and Akil’s alleged admission that he indeed stole the subject motor vehicle.

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC. There was “too much of a coincidence that two people stealing motorcycles on two different occasions would be wearing exactly the same articles of clothing as accessories as in this case.” Likewise, Akil confessed to Belardo while he was not under custodial investigation; such extrajudicial confession is valid and admissible as evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether Akil’s conviction for carnapping, as defined and penalized under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 10883, is proper.

RULING: No. Carnapping, under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 10883, is “the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.”

In People v. Pentecostes, a person accused of a crime may be convicted solely based on circumstantial evidence if the following requisites concur: (1) There is more than one circumstance; (2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, compatible with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and in conflict with the notion that he or she is innocent.

Here, the Court is not convinced that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution sufficiently established Akil’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Carnapping. The identification made by Belardo is unreliable and cannot be considered as a positive identification of Akil as the perpetrator of the crime in question, to wit: (1) Belardo’s identification was done through a show-up; (2) Belardo himself admitted that he was never able to see the face of the perpetrator of the crime in question; (3) there was a gap of 18 days between the time when the subject motor vehicle was stolen, and the time when Belardo visited Akil in detention. 

This, coupled with the fact that Belardo is not even an actual eyewitness, renders as flimsy the identification of Akil. No witness for the prosecution was able to testify about the perpetrator’s physical appearance. There was no testimony on the person’s significant features, distinguishing marks, height, or skin complexion. This, to the mind of the Court, raises doubt on the truthfulness of Belardo’s testimony and his identification of Akil as the perpetrator of the crime in question. Thus, there is a nagging doubt that Akil and the person in the CCTV footage are one and the same person, to the exclusion of other suspects. Belardo’s out-of-court identification of Akil cannot constitute as a positive identification of the latter as the perpetrator of the crime in question.

In People v. Wagas, the Court decreed that the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a finding of conviction, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.

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